Sometimes, the absence of a commitment can be the most telling sign. Discussing Budget problemsA recent CNAS event, Army Secretary Christine Wormuth gave an uncoded answer on the Future Attack Reconnaissance Aircraft (FARA) program – known to be Potential cuts targeted. “I think we are some distance away from being able to go fully unmanned,” Wormuth said. “Perhaps that is something further out in the future we can look at.”
While the Army has not officially thrown in the towel, the lack of a firm commitment signals FARA isn’t likely to happen in a budget environment where everyone is looking to the service as the bill payer. FARA is a good option, however. Does get canceled, the stakes get that much higher for the Army’s Future Long-Range Assault Aircraft (FLRAA) competition. As the only major rotary wing acquisition remaining, the FLRAA will now have generational impacts on warfighter capability – and the defense industrial base (DIB). It is crucial that Army meets all requirements.
When choosing an FLRAA, it is important to consider the assault mission first.
Lt. Gen. (Ret.) Ben Hodges has pointed out “the ability to mass combat power, infantry and equipment, directly onto the objective, many times in very tight places… is the key tenet of an air assault operation,” while remarking that “one of the challenges I had in Afghanistan was getting soldiers and equipment across mountain ranges or into landing zones at high altitude and hot temperatures.”
This is based on my 10 years of combat helicopter pilot experience in Afghanistan and as a test pilot. Although speed and range are important, they are not the most important criteria. What counts much more is the ability to land on the objective and mass combat power incredibly quickly – including supporting equipment, fires, and vehicles – and survive while you do it. Landing troops in waves because your assets can’t mass them safely in the landing zone is a recipe for mission failure.
Similarly, the effective in route time of an assault mission isn’t when the aircraft touches down – it’s when the soldier reaches the objective. Landing on the objective is a great way to surprise, succeed, and survive for soldiers with weapons and gear.
One of the planes under consideration for FLRAA. Defiant-X, completed the confined space landings mission Profile – including a 247-knot level ingress, rapid, level deceleration, and a vertical landing in an H-60-sized landing zone.
The DIB will be de-risked if the FLRAA decision is made correctly.
A healthy industrial base depends on a steady cycle of design and production. FARA is being cancelled and the FVL program ends. Industry will lose the incentives to invest in military-rotorcraft programs. The facilities and institutional knowledge necessary to produce these machines will also be lost.
FVL is the only major defense program that will begin fielding aircraft in 2030. Bell’s AH-1Z Viper operational deliveries began in 2012.
Sikorsky will begin operational deliveries of the CH-53K in 2025; Boeing’s CH-47F Block II will also Start in 2025. If the FARA configuration is delayed or canceled, then the FLRAA program would be the only major rotorcraft defence program in production well into this century.
Industrial capabilities can be very difficult, if not impossible to recover once they are lost. All of these capabilities require decades to develop. From manufacturing facilities, custom forges, tools, and jigs to artisans, technicians, tradesmen and engineers to production processes, to small businesses supporting sustainment, to manufacturing processes, it can take decades. Industry is less likely to invest in defense programs if it has a fickle Pentagon customer.
Industry has taken cues form the Pentagon ever since the beginning of the future vertical lift program. Bell has invested in state-of-the-art technology Manufacturing technology centerSikorsky has also developed a digital factoryDigital threads that connect design, production, sustainment.
The manufacturer must have a portfolio that can sustain operations, independent of the FARA program, in order to be eligible for FLRAA. It must also be able to produce and sustain digital designs. Only Sikorsky, out of the two FLRAA competitors builds aircraft that support all Services and has a mature, digital thread integrated into its design, production and sustainment processes.
Army should choose the option that offers the most cost-effective lifecycle, training, or infrastructure options.
While actions “on the X” are paramount, the aircraft can’t perform the mission without a proven, efficient production line and a robust supply chain. Production and delivery are crucial. Given this and Army’s aforementioned budget challenges, the service should avoid any FLRAA candidate that requires new hangers, ramp space, or a new production line. An FLRAA incompatible with the Army’s existing facilities means new military construction. Multiplying this cost across the 500 plus FLRAAs expected to be purchased quickly puts the price tag out of reach for a service already suffering significant cuts.
With FARA’s future in serious question, the Army must choose wisely on FLRAA. Senior decision-makers can weigh the benefits of the frame, the industrial base and the lifecycle costs.
Scott TrailRetired Marine CH-46E helicopter pilot, V-22 development test pilot, and member of the Society of Experimental Test Pilots.
