“Awareness” Will Not Save Us From Climate Disaster

Much of the discussion of the professional class today is indebted to the concept of the “professional-managerial class” (PMC) coined by Barbara and John Ehrenreich. The Ehrenreichs’ impetus for theorizing the PMC came from its centrality in shaping the New Left movements of the 1960s and ’70s. As they put it: “The rebirth of PMC radicalism in the sixties came at a time when the material position of the class was advancing rapidly. Employment in PMC occupations soared, and salaries rose with them.”

They describe how the best parts of the New Left certainly contested capitalist control of the economy but combined this with “moralistic contempt of the working class.” The Ehrenreichs cite the famous Port Huron Statement issued by Students for a Democratic Society: “Any new left in America must be, in large measure, a left with real intellectual skills, committed to deliberativeness, honesty, reflection as working tools.”

From a professional-class perspective, politics is a largely Cultural Terrain over knowledge and a coming to consensus on ideas. The professional class elevates “intellectual autonomy and public service” alongside credentials and expertise above all else.

Moreover, if the university is, in the Ehrenreichs’ words, “the historical reproductive apparatus of the PMC,” it also became an epicenter of two kinds of engagement with politics. First, there was a boom in academic technocrats and other highly-educated policy experts who supported the professional-class commitment of expertise in solving social or environmental problems. Second, the university was a bastion in a new mode for radical political theory. Culture that is centeredOver old class lines of struggle

Yet, as the Ehrenreichs explain, the class antagonisms between the PMC and the working class were never resolved, and by the end of the ’70s, the New Left collapsed into “more [of] a subculture than a ‘movement.’” As Jean-Christophe Agnew It is possible to suggest, the professional class’s abandonment of old class questions seems even starker as political power continued to shift rightward to capital: “Considering its relative inattention to issues of production, equity, exploitation, cultural politics may seem a singularly inappropriate politics for a time marked by the blatant transfer of wealth between classes.”

In other words, capitalists organized to acquire wealth and political power on their terms. Meanwhile, the Left, imbued by professional-class values, became convinced that class politics were outmoded, orthodox, and ill-equipped for a new “postindustrial” knowledge economy.

The environmental movement is perhaps the best example of the ways that the professional class has shaped new forms in politics.

Science was at the heart of shaping environmental movement consciousness and demands from its inception. Rachel Carson, a professional Marine Biologist, was the one who sparked this movement with her book. Silent Spring 1962. The ecology movement put scientific credentials at the heart of ecological politics. In 1972, theEcologist ran a Cover story called “A Blueprint for Survival,” which claimed a specific politics of authority: “This document has been drawn up by a small team of people, all of whom, in different capacities, are professionally involved in the study of global environmental problems.” The Club of Rome’s more famous 1972 Report on overpopulation, “The Limits to Growth,” enacted the same vision of politics — a struggle over a future adjudicated through scientific models and expertise.

It is not only “intellectual autonomy” but also commitment to “public service” that often characterizes professional-class values. This commitment is rooted the idea that professionals can use knowledge to make the world a better place.

I offer a very schematic sketch of different types of professionals in the climate political scene who seek to combine expertise and environmental “public service.”

First, let’s talk about the Science communicators Those who are either natural scientists like Rachel Carson and James Hansen or deeply interested in the science, such as science journalists or science writers. These people believe that ignorance or denial of scientific knowledge is the main problem in environmental politics. It asserts that if the masses truly understood, they would be able to make a difference. understoodThe science would lead to action.

There are two things. Policy technocrats Professionals whose expertise is based in policy studies or law are more likely to work in think tanks, academia or professionalized non-profits. Alongside universities, it is worth highlighting the rise of NGOs — as opposed to unions and parties — as critical centers of activism and politics in the same era where environmental politics arose. These types seek to design “smart” policy solutions to environmental problems. They believe logic and rational design can be used to persuade politicians and the public to support these policies.

Finally, there is the Radicals against the systemA kind of political radicalization is a result of their own exposure to the science behind ecological collapse. Many of these radicalizations are rooted in guilt about their complicity with consumption practices that are central to professional-class norms. This type of climate activist is more likely than others to see that capitalism is the root cause of environmental problems. However, their political response is to look inward with moralistic invocations to consume less and reject industrial society. They also advocate micro-alternatives at a local level. This kind of person might find the only outlet for such radical ideas in academia, or they might eschew a profession entirely in favor of more niche Knowledge systems like DIY off-the-grid living or studying “permaculture” agricultural techniques.

What connects these three highly schematic “types” is the centrality of knowledge systems Their political engagements with environmental issues. My goal is not merely to ignore the importance science and knowledge in shaping politics but to point out how this politics both avoids class struggle and material conflict, and appeals only the few who have these education credentials.

Professional class climate politics appeals primarily to professionals. They are however a small percentage of the population. We need a politics that appeals to more than the credentialed classes if we are to build a democratic majority in climate coalition. In other words, we need a working-class climate politics centered not on knowledge and smart policy, but rather more everyday materials struggle over access to energy, food, housing, and transportation — the very sectors we need to decarbonize.

While professional class sensibilities tend to assume solving climate change requires making these things cost more to “internalize” the costs of emissions, socialists can counter with a decarbonization program that guarantees access to these basic needs of working-class life. The 2018–20 explosion of Green New Deal proposals espousing this vision have sputtered lately, but we cannot lose sight of this basic insight that we should reorient climate policies toward direct improvements to workers’ lives who have suffered decades of neoliberal austerity and assault from the capitalist class war.